The family's central role in forming the individual's political personality derives from its role as the main source and locus for the satisfaction of all his basic, innate needs. The child therefore tends to identify with his parents and to adopt their outlook toward the political system. The father becomes the prototypical authority figure and thereby initiates the child's view of political authority. The politicization process, at least in America, is basically complete when the child is about thirteen. Under familial and other social circumstances in which the child progresses from dependence to autonomy, he is likely to develop into a mature and responsible citizen. When he suffers physical or emotional deprivation, he is likely to establish a pattern of chronic dependence that includes the political. When conflict generates between his own emerging needs, family patterns for satisfying them, and the demands and opportunities of the large society, the growing child is in mental turmoil. Only gradually, then, can he change from hierarchized to equalized patterns of political behavior, in which he can responsibly share power with his new equal fellow citizens.

The relationship between family and government has become obscure. The concept that government should not attempt to define or restrict relationships that merit legal treatment as "marriages" and "families" has become very popular among academics in the United States and many other nations. As Bruce Hafen, former Brigham Young University Law School Dean and family law professor writes, "the trend in most countries today is toward letting people decide for themselves how and when to form and dissolve marriages and child-parent ties."' Other family law scholars have noted the "privatization" of family law2 and the diminution of moral discourse in family law in the past three decades.' The prevailing viewpoint among scholars seems to be that government should accept as "marriage" or "family" any relationship that the parties wish to call a "marriage" or a "family."

Scholars, lawmakers, and judges assert that principles of equality or privacy require the state to treat all relationships the same; for instance, giving no special preference to marriage over non-marital cohabitation. The Governor of Hawaii stated that the state should "quit the business of issuing marriage licenses altogether."6 These ideas are based upon the assumption that the definition or structure of the family has no significant effect upon society. This article challenges that assumption and proposes that there is a relationship between the structures and forms of family relations that a society fosters, encourages, or restricts, and the social and political welfare of that society. Further, the article also suggests that a reciprocal relationship exists between a society's political structure and family welfare.

Recent and dramatic transitions from socialist and communist government systems to a democratic government system in many Central and Eastern European countries provides an exceptional opportunity to reconsider the relationships that exist between families and governments.7 These transitionscall forth the following questions: Why should emerging democratic governments that have many other critical issues to address (e.g., economy, education, health, redevelopment, crime, foreign relations, etc.) be interested in regulating families? How do family forms and relations affect government,and vice versa? Why have most governments, across time and culture, focused on regulating the family? The short answer to these questions is that family matters and the quality and strength of the family directly supports the strength of a nation. Indeed, a nation's values and strength are but the sum total of the values and strength of its families.

This analysis may be categorized as conservative because it favors preserving special legal preferences and protections for marriage and for marriage-based families. Labels such as "liberal" and "conservative," however, are relative and, when used in an international or transcultural context, are misleading and of little value. For instance, thirty years ago in the Philippines, divorce was illegal. Marriages could only be dissolved by annulment, which was a very difficult and expensive process that rarely occurred. The consequences of such a rigid and narrow divorce regime were tragic for many families To prevent tragic consequences to families, divorce laws needed to be liberalized to make it possible for couples to obtain a divorce without excessive cost or procedural hassles upon proving they were separated for a year or two.

At the same time in the United States, however, unilateral "no-fault" divorce laws were approaching adoption throughout the country. Those laws allowed for "quickie," unilateral, and legalized abandonment of a spouse with no consideration for the desires or circumstances of the other spouse or the family. Additionally, they did not allow any actual examination of whether the marital relationship was truly irretrievably broken.9 Those "no-fault" divorce laws were as flawed and extreme as the "no divorce" laws of the Philippines. Instead of either of these extremes, divorce upon proof that a legally married couple has lived separate and apart for one to two years seems a logical compromise in both situations. Such an idea was considered very liberal in the Philippines, yet very conservative in the United States. Therefore, labels such as "liberal" and "conservative" are not helpful in comparative international family law studies.